Powell's Predicament

by John Gershman
July 26, 2002

0207powelltrip.pdf [printer-friendly version]

As Secretary of State Colin Powell prepares to embark on an extended trip through Asia, he is no doubt reflecting upon the difficulties he faces in an administration that has granted the Pentagon pride of place in defining and shaping U.S. policy in the region. Awash with funds and a global mandate to combat terrorism, the Pentagon has marginalized Powell and the State Department, entrenching itself as the dominant player in Asia after September 11th. A reflection of this weakness is that Powell's trip is being met with more enthusiasm in the region than in Washington, where his trip is largely being greeted with a yawn.

Powell leaves on July 26 for a trip that will take him to India and Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Along the way he will go to Brunei to participate in the multilateral meetings held following the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference.

As Powell leapfrogs westward across Asia from Pakistan to the Philippines his focus is on shoring up the coalition for the war on terrorism. With India and Pakistan, his main objective is to maintain the tense peace in Kashmir that has existed since both countries massed troops at their border last December and nearly expanded to an all-out war in May. Recent attacks by violent jihadi groups with ties to Pakistani intelligence and military agencies have placed the de facto agreement reached in late May in jeopardy. In Southeast Asia, Powell is meeting with the key U.S. allies in the war on terrorism, signing a U.S.-ASEAN agreement on combating terrorism, and bringing some technical assistance along as a gift.

The irony is that as currently designed, Powell's efforts to strengthen the coalition against terrorism reinforce the very forces that have undermined his power and influence within the administration. Prior to the September 11th attacks, Powell's influence--albeit uneven--appeared to be significant within the administration. His more traditional realpolitik approach--particularly regarding policy toward China--seemed to be winning some intra-administration battles, to the chagrin of the more militaristic and unilateralist of the Bush administration foreign policy team and their hallelujah chorus in conservative think-tanks.

Since September 11th, however, the momentum has clearly swung in favor of the Pentagon and the unilateralists. An invasion of Iraq appears to be simply a matter of time, and in its most recent snub, the Bush administration overruled Powell's stance on funding for the United Nations Population Fund. While the Pentagon is awash in new funds to combat terrorism, the State Department is suffering from a lack of trained personnel in key posts abroad (especially in Asia) and has had to beg for increases to its foreign aid budget. Both civilian and uniformed Pentagon officials have had a higher profile in Southeast Asia than any State Department personnel. The Congress is considering lifting bans on aid to the Indonesian military and has already increased aid to the Philippine military--both of which have been complicit in serious human rights abuses and are largely unaccountable to civilian authority. The Bush administration's policy toward Pakistan has been to sacrifice democracy in the name of protecting President Musharraf and the Pakistani military's role as deputies in the war against al Qaeda. Finally, many political leaders in Southeast Asia feel that this administration is interested solely in cooperative efforts that narrowly advance the war on terror, without addressing other concerns, as would occur in a more cooperative relationship.

This is particularly troubling because while the Pentagon is expanding a web of military aid and alliances under the guise of fighting the war on terrorism, the security challenges facing the U.S. in Asia are not primarily military in nature. A more appropriate strategy would require reversing U.S. policies that strengthen unaccountable militaries, thereby undermining fragile democratic institutions and weak economies. What is needed are resources for strengthening civilian governmental institutions, fighting poverty, and expanding genuine cooperation. What is needed, in short, is diplomacy.

The stakes of this trip are high for Secretary Powell: demonstrate the State Department's continued relevance in the region amidst its declining influence in policymaking and insufficient financial and human resources. Powell's predicament is how to bring diplomacy back into U.S. foreign policy with an administration apparently committed to excising diplomacy from U.S. policy in Asia.

(John Gershman <john@irc-online.org> is a Senior Analyst at the Interhemispheric Resource Center (www.irc-online.org) and Asia/Pacific editor for Foreign Policy in Focus (www.fpif.org).)