The Progressive Response

Volume 3, Number 4
February 10, 1999

The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. The project produces Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) briefs on various areas of current foreign policy debate. Electronic mail versions are available free of charge for subscribers. The Progressive Response is designed to keep the writers, contributors, and readers of the FPIF series informed about new issues and debates concerning U.S. foreign policy issues.

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Table of Contents

RECONFIGURING MEXICO POLICY
by Eric Olson, Washington Office on Latin America

STATISTICAL BACKGROUND ON U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS

PINOCHET CASE ON THE WEB

 


RECONFIGURING MEXICO POLICY
by Eric Olson, Washington Office on Latin America

(Ed. Note: President Clinton plans to travel to Mexico to meet with President Zedillo, possibly as early as February 15. Eric Olson, a Mexico expert with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), offers the following perspective on the state of U.S.-Mexico relations along with recommendations for a reconfigured U.S. policy. This is excerpted from a FPIF brief, now online at http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n07mex.html)

Despite the obvious importance of Mexico, current U.S. policy is fragmented, often contradictory, and lacks a clear strategy or focus. U.S. policy is dominated by a counternarcotics strategy that has resulted in greater instability in bilateral relations while failing to curb the flow of illegal drugs. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the centerpiece of U.S. economic relations with Mexico, has failed to produce the broad-based economic prosperity in Mexico that proponents had predicted. Ironically, issues that would contribute to greater peace and prosperity--such as human rights, democracy, and poverty reduction--are completely off the official agenda.

The war on drugs has become the top priority--and the greatest source of friction--in U.S. relations with Mexico. The Clinton administration argues that Mexican drug production and trafficking not only pose a threat to the health and well-being of America, but also threaten to undermine Mexican stability. Because as much as two-thirds of all cocaine enters the U.S. through Mexico, and Mexico is the source of 20-30% of the heroin and 80% of all methamphetamine that enters the U.S., Washington has pursued an aggressive strategy. Largely bypassing what were believed to be hopelessly corrupt Mexican police and judicial institutions, the Clinton administration turned instead to developing partnerships with the Mexican military. Among other things, the U.S. has sent 73 helicopters and other excess military equipment to aid the Mexican military in counternarcotics operations. In fiscal year 1997 the State and Defense departments spent approximately $83 million on counternarcotics efforts in Mexico.

A key component of U.S. drug policy is the annual certification process, whereby Clinton must certify before Congress the extent to which other countries are "fully cooperating" with U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Even though Mexico is consistently certified, the process has led to rancorous debate both within the administration and with Congress in the last two years. Spectacular cases of corruption among Mexican military and civilian authorities have fanned the flames of congressional drug warriors bent on decertifying Mexico.

Meanwhile, the certification process, intended to leverage greater cooperation from other countries, has become a major irritant in U.S.-Mexican relations. Mexico sees the process as unilateral, hypocritical, and particularly offensive because the U.S. is the world's biggest consumer of illegal drugs and the driving force behind the drug cartels.

Unlike drug policy, bilateral economic relations have ceased to be an issue of much public debate within U.S. policy circles. Yet the absence of public debate should not cloud the fact that bilateral economic relations--and greater economic integration, in particular--continue to be the centerpiece of U.S. efforts to promote prosperity in Mexico.

NAFTA, now entering its sixth year, is Washington's primary vehicle for Mexican economic integration. The agreement joined Mexico, the U.S., and Canada in the world's largest free trade area and was supposed to usher Mexico into the developed world. But the high expectations it generated have failed to materialize. Despite sparking record trade levels and foreign investment, economic integration has also linked Mexico to an increasingly volatile global economy. For example, the Asian and Russian financial crises have rebounded negatively toward Mexico, eroding investor confidence in most developing countries.

Problems With Mexico Policy

Current U.S. policy toward Mexico is fundamentally flawed for three reasons. It undermines peace and prosperity in Mexico by pursuing failed counternarcotics and economic integration strategies. It has largely ignored Mexico's serious human rights situation and blinked at armed conflicts that have a direct impact on peace and stability. It has never seriously encouraged the struggle for democracy under way in Mexico and, at times, has even weakened it.

Although the proponents of economic integration have declared NAFTA an unqualified success due to increasing bilateral trade, an analysis of salaries and poverty statistics suggests another view. By the end of 1997, average salaries for all Mexican workers had fallen to 60% of their 1994 value. In addition, according to a study by Mexico's National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information (INEGI), extreme poverty rose by 53% from 1994 while income became increasingly concentrated.

U.S. counternarcotics policies have had a destabilizing impact on bilateral relations, because they are perceived by Mexico as unilateral and hypocritical, undermining what little binational cooperation exists. Mexico has consistently protested a policy that judges them for their counternarcotics efforts but does not judge the efforts of the largest consumer of illegal drugs-namely, the United States. Additionally, U.S. promotion of an expanded role for the Mexican military in antidrug and public security operations has further weakened civilian law enforcement institutions, has contributed to the military's greater exposure to corruption, and has sparked a dramatic increase in human rights violations committed by the military. Furthermore, the lines between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations have become increasingly blurred in several parts of Mexico, because counternarcotics operations often occur in the same place where military forces are confronting armed insurgents.

The dangers of U.S. counternarcotics strategies are exacerbated by Washington's failure to consider Mexico's dismal human rights record. According to a report issued by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights in October 1998, counternarcotics efforts in Mexico are often the context for human rights violations. The commission has received numerous complaints of "enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, which have taken place in the context of the fight against guerilla groups, drug trafficking, and common crime."

The U.S. has shied away from Mexican democracy issues, even though it has long maintained that promotion of democratic societies is the key to global stability. Ironically, though Washington's stake in stability is highest in Mexico, promotion of democracy is seen as nearly impossible there due to Mexican sensitivities to foreign intervention. Furthermore, with counternarcotics efforts and economic integration considered to be more pressing priorities, democracy has slipped off the U.S. agenda. The U.S. has largely accepted as fact that Mexico is irreversibly on a path toward full democratization. Thus Washington has not invested much in promoting electoral or institutional democratization in Mexico.

U.S. policy has been quick to overlook the challenges that remain in Mexico's democratic transition and is overly optimistic about the outcome of Mexico's struggle for democracy. By not paying sufficient attention to the problems, Washington has made two mistakes. First, it tends to view political instability, such as the conflicts in Chiapas and Guerrero, as local matters reflecting local disputes rather than as symptoms of a wider failure of democracy throughout Mexico. These conflicts are not just about poverty or local land disputes, as some have argued, but are also about the right to self-determination, electoral freedom, and gaining a voice in basic decisions about governance. Second, U.S. policy has contributed to undermining Mexico's democratic transition by supporting a greater role for the Mexican military in civilian affairs and by failing to support the creation of strong civilian institutions that are transparent and publicly accountable.

Toward a Mexico Policy

America's challenge is to define a new foreign policy that ensures peace and prosperity in Mexico by promoting progressive values--such as greater economic equity, participatory democracy, and respect for human rights--without falling into the traditional paternalism of U.S. foreign policy. There are four basic components to such a policy.

First, U.S.-Mexican relations should be based squarely on symmetry, cooperation, and mutual respect. For example, the current drug certification process urgently needs to be replaced with a new multilateral approach in which countries cooperate to fashion mutually acceptable goals and strategies in combating illegal drugs. Support for the Multilateral Counterdrug Alliance, established during the presidential summit in Santiago, Chile, in April 1998, should be the cornerstone of this new approach.

Second, the U.S. must make reducing poverty and combating inequality the cornerstone of its relations with Mexico and the rest of Latin America. Although trade can play an important part in Mexico's development, the current free trade model has merely exacerbated the inequalities in Mexican society. Ideally, both countries should undertake an objective review of NAFTA and make adjustments to those aspects of the agreement that have had the greatest impact on poor people, especially in the rural sector. For example, it may be necessary to provide extended tariff protection to producers of basic grains, most of whom are peasants and indigenous farmers.

Third, U.S. counternarcotics policy must be fundamentally changed. In the last few years, the U.S. has trained large numbers of Mexican military personnel in counternarcotics courses. There has been an expanded role for the Mexican military in antinarcotics activities far exceeding any external defense concerns, which is problematic if only for that reason. Furthermore, U.S. counternarcotics courses are said to be very similar in content to counterinsurgency courses, and as the U.S. currently does not track where the trained Mexican soldiers are subsequently stationed, it is impossible to know if the skills they learned are used in counternarcotics efforts or in counterinsurgency operations in Chiapas. Instead of a militarized approach to combating drug trafficking, the U.S. must begin from the premise that lower demand at home is the most effective way to combat illegal drugs.

Finally, Washington should make strengthening the rule of law the centerpiece of its efforts to promote greater democracy and human rights in Mexico. Without strong, transparent, and accountable judicial institutions, human rights violations will continue to increase, as will corruption. The U.S. need not dictate reforms, but can just shift its support away from militarized solutions to the difficult but necessary task of building democratic institutions.

Sources for More Information

Development Group for Alternative Policies
Email: DGAP@igc.org
Website: http://www.igc.org/dgap/

Drug Strategies
Email: dspolicy@aol.com
Website: http://www.drugstrategies.org/

Economic Policy Institute
Email: epi@epinet.org
Website: http://epinet.org/

Global Exchange
Email: info@globalexchange.org
Website: http://www.globalexchange.org/

Human Rights Watch
Email: hrwdc@hrw.org
Website: http://www.hrw.org/

Latin America Data Base
Email: info@ladb.unm.edu
Website: http://ladb.unm.edu/

Washington Office on Latin America
Email: wola@wola.org
Website: http://www.wola.org/

Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos
Website: http://www.laneta.apc.org/cmdpdh/

Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights Center
Website: http://www.laneta.apc.org/cdhbcasas/

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico, 1998
Website: http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Mexico98en/table-of-contents.htm

Just the Facts
A Civilian's Guide To U.S. Defense And Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean
Website: http://www.ciponline.org/facts/

Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center
Website: http://mixcoac.uia.mx/~prodh/default.htm

Office of National Drug Control Policy
Website: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/

U.S. Department of State
Mexico Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997
Website: http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/mexico.html

U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce
Website: http://www.usmcoc.org/

 


STATISTICAL BACKGROUND ON U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS

Mexico's Major Trading Partners (98 est)
Exports: U.S. (85%), Canada (2.1%), Japan (1%)
Imports: U.S. (74.8%), Japan (4.1%), Germany (3.5%), Canada (1.8%)

Mexico's External Debt
$162 billion (97)

Total U.S.-Mexico Trade
$81 billion (93) $174 billion (98 est)
Mexico accounts for 55% of all U.S. exports to Latin America and Caribbean

U.S.-Mexico Trade Balance
$16.6 billion (93) -$15.7 billion (98 est)

U.S. Direct Investment in Mexico
$16.9 billion (94) $25.3 billion (98 est)

U.S. Security Assistance for Counternarcotics
(includes training, excess defense sales, DOD Section 1004, and DOD support for International Narcotics Control Fund)
$83 million (97) $28 million (98 est)

Other U.S. Security Assistance/Sales
Foreign Military and Constructions Sales (loans)
$37.1 million (97) $15 million (98 est)

Direct Commercial Sales
$146.7 million (96) $30.9 million (97)

U.S. Economic Aid
(includes development assistance, child survival, and Economic Support Funds, and $ 1 million in USAID support in '98 for International Narcotics Control Fund)
$16.3 million (97) $11.3 million (98 est.)

 


PINOCHET CASE ON THE WEB

(Ed. Note: The following are more sources on the Pinochet case provided by Michael Ratner, author of the FPIF brief, The Pinochet Precedent, which is posted on the FPIF website at:
http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n06pin.html
.)

Amnesty International
Website: http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/pinochet/
(Documents from on the Pinochet case)

BBC Pinochet page
Website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/special_report/1998/10/98/the_pinochet_file/
newsid_198000/198306.stm

Chilean British Committee for Justice
Website: http://www.labournet.org.uk/www.labournet.org.uk/pinochet/index.html
(Updates on Pinochet case and other materials)

Derechos Humanos
Website: http://www.derechos.org/
(Human rights site with materials on Pinochet)

National Security Archives
Website: http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm
(U.S.-Chile documents)

Judgments from the House of Lords
Website: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldjudgmt/ldjudgmt.htm
(Judgments on the Pinochet case)

Redress
Website: http://www.redress.org/
Text of Spain's indictment against Pinochet

Transnational Institute
Websites: http://www.worldcom.nl/tni/history/history.htm

 


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