The Progressive ResponseVolume 3, Number 7
Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)
Table of ContentsKURDISTAN POLICY CRITIQUED U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
KURDISTAN POLICY CRITIQUED
The Kurds are a nation of more than 20 million whose population is divided between no less than six separate countries and whose nationalist movements have been rife with factionalism. The worst repression against the Kurds in recent years has come from Turkey, a NATO country that receives large-scale military, economic, and diplomatic support from the United States. On several occasions in recent years, thousands of Turkish troops crossed into Iraqi territory to attack the Kurds. Though these incursions also took place in the U.N. safe zone and have been far greater in scope than Saddam's 1996 forays, President Clinton supported the Turkish attacks, making his harsh responses to the Iraq's incursion appear to be motivated by other than humanitarian or legal concerns. While the United States clearly wants Saddam Hussein out of power in Iraq, the U.S. and other powers may not want to risk the country's total disintegration. The U.S. wants neither a victory by a radical Kurdish movement in the north nor a successful rebellion in the south of the country, where an Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim movement has challenged the authority of the Sunni Muslim-dominated government in Baghdad. At the same time, the totalitarian nature of the Iraqi regime makes the prospects of internal change difficult, at least as long as the population is suffering so much economic hardship from the sanctions. In 1998, the United States successfully pressured Syria to expel Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a radical Kurdish nationalist guerrilla group fighting Turkey for greater autonomy. The U.S.-backed Turkish regime has used the PKK's sometimes brutal tactics as an excuse to crush even nonviolent expressions of Kurdish nationalism (even speaking the Kurdish language or celebrating Kurdish cultural life is severely repressed). Kurdish civilians have been the primary targets of Turkey's counterinsurgency campaign. The United States has been largely silent against Turkish repression, but active in condemning what is sees as Kurdish terrorism. In February 1999, the United States assisted Turkish intelligence agents in locating Ocalan in Kenya, from where he was kidnapped and brought to Turkey to face what virtually all outside observers (the Clinton State Department being an exception) saw as unfair judicial treatment. U.S. military and diplomatic support of Turkey's repression of the Kurds is quite consistent with U.S. acquiescence to other controversial policies by its NATO ally. The U.S. has blocked enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions 353 and 354 calling for Turkey to withdraw its occupation forces from northern Cyprus. The U.S. has failed to condemn widespread human rights violations against Turkey's own population. The U.S. has refused to even acknowledge the Turkish genocide against the Armenians earlier this century, in which well over one million people were slaughtered. Such policies, which reject adherence to international law or basic standards of human rights, further undermine U.S. credibility in the Middle East.
U.S. POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
AND CARIBBEAN
U. S. Policy in Latin America: Problems, Opportunities, Recommendations Comparing conditions in the Western Hemisphere today with the situation fifteen years ago, there appears to be much room for optimism. The armed conflicts in Central America, which were at the center of policy debates in the United States, have all ended with negotiated solutions, and the authoritarian dictators that ravaged South America were one-by-one replaced by elected civilian officials. Massive government-sponsored human rights abuses have declined dramatically as a result, and economic growth has resumed after a lost decade. Upon taking office, senior Clinton administration officials painted this rosy assessment of regional trends and proposed a foreign policy agenda for Latin America centered around the concept of "enlargement and engagement," based on the now-familiar arguments that open economies foster growth and allow greater political freedoms and that democracies make more reliable allies. With the exception of Cuba, they point out, every country in the hemisphere is on the same economic and political track, headed toward the completion of a free trade alliance from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego to be established by the year 2005. Waving the free trade banner, the Clinton administration has made promoting U.S. economic interests its number one priority in U.S. policy toward the region. In an interview with the New York Times just prior to beginning his second term in office, President Clinton boldly proclaimed that pursuing free trade agreements with Latin American countries would be among his highest priorities during his second term. Clinton, however, did not live up to his word, and shortly into his second term Latin America faded from the administration's agenda (with the important exception of the "war on drugs"). More importantly, the Clinton administration's message rings hollow for the vast majority in Latin America and the Caribbean who have failed to benefit either from democracy or economic growth, which has not trickled down as promised. Elected civilian governments remain fragile and are threatened by continued military impunity and weak institutional guarantees of fundamental civil, political, and individual rights. Today there is mounting evidence that the obstacles to democratic consolidation are growing and that the neoliberal economic model is simply not capable of addressing fundamental problems like the lack of employment opportunities and the inequitable distribution of income and resources. Moreover, it fails to take into account the very real danger of sharp reversals in the positive regional trends of democratization, demilitarization, and greater respect for human rights. Income Disparities Remain Unaddressed Poverty, lack of access to land and resources, and tremendous income disparities remain fundamental problems that have yet to be addressed adequately throughout the region. According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), during the first half of this decade the proportion of the population living in poverty has decreased slightly (from 41 percent in 1990 to 39 percent in 1995); however, the number of people living in poverty has increased significantly due to population growth. Some 75 million more people live in poverty today in the region than in 1980. The Latin American region continues to have the highest level of income inequality in the world, a situation that has seen virtually no improvement in most countries and has deteriorated even further in some. Despite average annual growth rates of 3.2 percent since 1990, the richest 10 percent of households maintained or increased income levels, while the poorest 40 percent held steady or experienced decreased income. In other words, the modest and even, in some cases, exceptional economic growth rates of the 1990s have not led either to fewer people living in poverty or to a more equitable distribution of income. Nor has economic growth resulted in stability, as evident in the economic crises in Mexico in 1994 and Brazil in 1998, both leading to billion-dollar bailout packages. Illustrative of the fragility of the region's economy, in Mexico investor flight led to near-economic collapse as nervous investors, able to move millions with a click on the keyboard, pulled out capital overnight, thereby revealing the fragility of economies built on short-term, high-yield investments rather than long-term investments in infrastructure and industry. The tendency toward speculative investment means that more jobs are lost than created in countries like Mexico, where nearly 2 million jobs have been lost (even taking into account employment in the maquiladora sector) since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. Despite decades of free-market and structural adjustment policies, high unemployment and widespread underemployment--and hence pervasive poverty--remain rampant in the region. Brazil's economic crisis has already hit Argentina and threatens to spill over into other parts of the region, and will likely stifle growth rates for 1999 and beyond. The response of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), calling for more belt-tightening by the Brazilian government in order to restore investor confidence, will exacerbate poverty even further--particularly in rural regions of the country long neglected by the central government. The sharp price increases resulting from the IMF "remedy" affect everyone, but have hurt the poor the most. Even World Bank and other IFI officials now recognize that the focus on market-driven economic growth alone is unlikely to reduce poverty and lead to greater equality. Both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are engaged in a range of projects designed to strengthen local institutions, build human capital, and improve education. Yet as a result of the mandatory fiscal restraint required by the IFIs, local governments have vastly fewer resources to invest in development programs than in the past, and U.S. development assistance has dropped to an all-time low. IFI-supported safety net programs may be too little too late, because they ignore the structural causes of poverty and underdevelopment. Economic power remains in the hands of traditional and new elites, who have been the main beneficiaries of reforms. For them, "globalization" has meant the opportunity to invest capital wherever in the world it can bring the greatest return at the least risk. Hurricanes and Short-Sighted Policies Hurricane Mitch, which devastated Central America in November 1998, marks a shift toward much greater poverty in the countries affected, particularly among the rural poor. It left millions homeless, damaged already-limited rural infrastructure, and destroyed both grains and export crops. The United Nations Development Program estimates reconstruction costs at more than $5.3 billion. Some of the damage was the result of the most fierce meteorological event to strike the isthmus in 200 years. But it is also clear that the destruction was made that much more catastrophic by short-sighted agricultural policies. National governments and the IFIs have failed to formulate and fund policies that support sustainable rural development. Destructive practices--including clear-cut logging, hillside farming, and degradation of topsoil by over-cultivation of marginal land--exacerbated the mudslides and flooding caused by the torrential rains. The Clinton administration's 1999 package of nearly $1 billion for debt relief and long-term reconstruction programs for the Central American countries hit hardest by Hurricane Mitch (and to a lesser extent to address hurricane and earthquake damage in Haiti, Puerto Rico, and Colombia) is an important step forward. But too much of this aid is being channeled through the U.S. military, and the debt-relief measures fall far short of what is needed. Central American countries also need new U.S. trade policies that ease restrictions on regional exports and development policies that prioritize the poor, focus on rural development and sustainability, and allow for the involvement of civil society organizations in their design and implementation. The U.S. aid package to Central America represents the first significant infusion of economic assistance to the region in more than a decade. Dwindling U.S. foreign aid has increased the importance of direct foreign investment and IFI loans in the provision of foreign capital to Latin America and the Caribbean. Nonetheless, Washington remains the most important external actor because of the markets and investment that the United States represents and also in part because of the influence its wields within the IFIs. In addition to the traditional U.S. hegemony in the region, U.S. economic interests have expanded as "globalization" trends have taken hold. U.S. exports to Latin America and the Caribbean have tripled in the last ten years to the point where almost half of all U.S. exports to developing countries go to the Latin American region; within ten years Latin America is expected to be the primary market for U.S. products and services. Mexico now rivals Japan as the second largest U.S. trading partner. Goods purchased from the United States represent more than forty percent of all imports by countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and nearly 60 percent of all foreign investment in the region comes from the United States. The hemisphere is well on its way toward economic integration, with or without "fast track." Toward a New Policy From United Fruit to Lockheed-Martin and McDonnell-Douglas, U.S. companies have helped shape--and have sometimes dictated--U.S. actions in Latin America and the Caribbean. U.S. domestic interests have historically played a preponderant role in U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, and its importance has only grown in the post-cold war environment. If U.S. policymakers were willing to stand up to narrow political and economic interests and to play a leadership role in unmasking the "threats" from abroad, they could reshape U.S. policy toward the hemisphere in fundamental ways. Washington must address the asymmetrical power relations between Latin American countries and the United States by integrating Latin American viewpoints into U.S. foreign policy, allowing countries to determine their own national development paths, and providing the resources, debt relief and the preferential trade and investment policies needed to overcome the vast differences in wealth and power between North and South. Specific Recommendations Three concrete steps could be taken to move in a new direction. First, the U.S. government should make poverty elimination the centerpiece of its policy toward Latin America and should redirect economic resources toward that end--even if that means cuts in the virtually untouchable defense budget. Second, Washington should recognize that it will never be able to solve the very real problems of illicit drug abuse and drug-related violence through military action overseas. Though the U.S. can and should provide resources both for judicial and police reform and for alternative development efforts in Latin America, illicit drug control efforts should prioritize treatment and education efforts in the United States. Likewise, Washington should resist the temptation to support militarized solutions to the very real problem of crime sweeping Latin America and should instead focus on the difficult task of promoting long-term institutional reform and the strengthening of civilian institutions, such as the judiciary. Such reform processes must be participatory to be successful, incorporating civil society and citizen involvement. Finally, Washington should act more forcefully to promote democratization trends in Latin America by eliminating U.S. security assistance to military forces, strengthening the capacity of local elected civilian governments and citizens to define the role of those forces, and speaking out more aggressively to defend democracy when transgressions occur. A range of other initiatives should be adopted as well, including an end to the Cuban trade embargo, the initiation of a policy of constructive engagement toward Cuba, and at least a two-year moratorium on the sale of sophisticated weapons to Latin American governments. In this post-cold war era, with democratically elected governments in place throughout most of the region, there is a historic opportunity to transform Latin America policy beyond mere calculations of opportunities and threats to an outlook of engaging the region's citizens and leaders in constructing a common vision of the hemisphere's promise-a promise of durable and inclusive democracy, respect for human rights, and sustainable and shared prosperity. Coletta Youngers is a Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). WOLA Executive Director George Vickers also contributed to this essay.
An overriding goal of the Foreign Policy In Focus project is to promote a new foreign policy agenda for the United States. As we work toward that goal, we are attempting to formulate region- and issue-specific agendas, which will then be compiled into a comprehensive Global Affairs Agenda. The first of these agendas concerns Latin America. It has been compiled largely from the numerous policy briefs we have produced on the region and from the special report by Youngers, and it is now being circulated for comments. The agenda has a short policy overview section, followed by more detailed sections on the political, economic, drug control, and military aspects of U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. We encourage you to go to the Global Affairs Agenda section of our website to read the draft Latin America Agenda and offer comments. The principles, analysis, and recommendations contained in the overall Global Affairs agenda will represent the synthesis of the essays we have assigned, the recommendations of the Foreign Policy In Focus briefs, internal discussions, the presentations at our forums, and comments by the network of analysts and organizations that have contributed to the more than 130 policy briefs and reports distributed by this project. In addition, we plan to integrate (with appropriate credit) elements of the reform agendas of other organizations that focus on U.S. policy in different regions and on specific issues. Like the Foreign Policy In Focus project itself, the effort to formulate and popularize a new global affairs agenda strives to be inclusive and to build on the excellent work of organizations and experts throughout the world. We are building the agenda step by step. First Step: The project editors, Tom Barry of IRC and Martha Honey of IPS, will incorporate the recommendations from the project's briefs and reports (which have involved hundreds of writers and commentators) into region-specific (Latin America, for example) and issue-specific (peace and security, for example) agendas. Second Step: These drafts will be circulated to leading organizations and experts for comments, additions, and criticisms. We will also ask if there are elements of reform agendas promoted by other organizations that we should include or reference. Third Step: The project editors together with the project's advisory committee will consider comments and revise drafts accordingly. Final agenda items will reference sources (FPIF policy briefs, reports, other agendas, and organizations). Fourth Step: The various region- and issue-specific agendas will be joined into a comprehensive agenda, which will be distributed as a document for purposes of promoting wider discussion of the role of U.S. as a responsible global leader and partner in global affairs and to foster advocacy work. Fifth Step: The project editors will produce a condensed version of the Global Affairs Agenda for circulation and endorsement by advocacy groups and constituency organizations in an effort to consolidate a network of support for new U.S. foreign policy. This agenda will also be distributed to congressional policymakers, their staffs, and congressional candidates. As part of the process of formulating region- and issue-specific agendas, we hope to identify areas of contention about U.S. foreign policy reform. In the process of constructing the Latin America Agenda, we would like to encourage discussion over such issues as U.S. immigration policy, police training as a purported "democracy building" effort, the call for preferential trade privileges for such countries as Haiti, and U.S. free trade policy with respect to banana exports to Europe.
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