The Progressive ResponseVolume 3, Number 8
Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)
Table of ContentsI. Updates and Out-TakesNATO AT 50: DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES II. Comments
I. Updates and Out-TakesNATO AT 50: DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES
This year, 1999, will be a defining year for the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). This military alliance of 14 European nations, the United States, and Canada will celebrate its 50th anniversary in April by convening a summit in Washington, DC. NATO will also conclude the first round of expansion by formally inaugurating the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. The alliance was created under U.S. leadership in 1949, and was designed to deter and defend the West against the Soviet military threat. Historically, the United States provided the largest share of funds, troops, and weapons to NATO's activities, and dominated the alliance's decision-making. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact invalidated NATO's original mandate and prompted a search for a new approach to European security. Several new roles were proposed for NATO: to serve as a forum for arms reduction and elimination, or to become a political force for consolidating democratic, capitalist systems throughout Europe, including Russia. Another option was complete abolition of NATO. On a continent devoid of superpower rivalries, the new type of challenges--peacekeeping, conflict prevention--could be handled by the 55-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the designated collective security organization on this continent. The OSCE, which includes all European countries, the United States, Canada, and the former Soviet Union republics, is specializing in conflict monitoring and prevention, arms reduction, and post-conflict reconciliation. Before completing a comprehensive review of the need for NATO, the alliance was thrust in the peacekeeping role in the Balkan wars. When the activities of the United Nations and the European Union failed to prevent escalation of the violence in Bosnia, NATO's was called on to deliver punitive strikes against the aggressor, Bosnian Serb forces. NATO troops entered the country in December 1995 to safeguard implementation the Dayton peace agreement. In June 1998, NATO countries extended the mandate of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia indefinitely. In July 1997, primarily at U.S. urging, NATO decided to invite three former Warsaw Pact countries to join the alliance This watershed event in NATO's post-Cold War history marked the end of the search for an alternative security arrangement. Despite the absence of a clearly articulated purpose, the United States and the European countries established NATO as the dominant security organization in Europe. In a way, the expansion itself, coupled with the peacekeeping duties in the Balkans, became the alliance's raison d'etre. But the decision carried a financial as well as a political price--the expansion to former Warsaw Pact countries, NATO's continued emphasis on territorial defense and the persisting dominant role of the United States in NATO damaged U.S. relations with Russia and contributed to the radicalization of the Russian political scene. NATO's attempts at damage control, such as signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, a largely unimplemented document on cooperation, failed to weaken Moscow's opposition. The Yeltsin government accepted the first round of expansion as a fait accompli while opposing the expansion in principle and protesting the plans to include former Soviet Union republics in particular. The financial costs of expansion--the costs of upgrading weapons in the new member countries and buying communications and navigation systems compatible with NATO--are born by these nations themselves as well as U.S. taxpayers. All three top NATO candidates increased their defense spending to cover the costs associated with membership. Nevertheless, the U.S. assistance was required to help bring the invitees to NATO standards. For example, the United States paid for installations of an air surveillance system in Poland and would cover the costs of leasing surplus F-16 or F/A-18 fighter aircraft to the Polish air force. NATO continues to evolve with the United States advocating new missions and a more assertive approach to military operations. The U.S. proposals discussed at the beginning of 1999 would authorize operations out of the territory of the alliance members. U.S. officials also argue that NATO should no longer be obligated to secure a UN Security Council approval for its military operations. The U.S. Administration hopes to formalize these and other proposals for NATO's future missions in a number of documents slated for adoption at the alliance's 50th anniversary summit. Far from settling the question of NATO's roles and responsibilities, the proposals raise a number or questions on the stability of the European security order. As the scope of NATO's roles expands, the alliance's expansion to Central and Eastern Europe appears to be slowing down. At a July 1997 summit in Madrid, the alliance decided to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join NATO, and to continue expanding to include all countries willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. But even as the first round of expansion nears its completion, the original plans are being revised and delayed. Both the German Chancellor and the Canadian Foreign Minister suggested that further expansion will be delayed by a number of years. Problems with Current Foreign Policy At a December 1998 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright laid out U.S. proposals for the new missions for the alliance. NATO must maintain the ability to defend the member states, the Secretary said, but it should also expand its scope to counter the threat of the weapons of mass destruction and stop the spread of ethnic and regional violence, inside and beyond the alliance's borders. Secretary Albright's vision is one of NATO keeping its traditional duty to protect the members' territory while adopting collective security tasks such as conflict prevention and peacekeeping. The proposals raise a number of problems. In explaining the proposal to expand NATO's responsibilities beyond territorial defense, Secretary Albright argued that "it makes sense to use the unified military structure and the habits of cooperation we have built up over the past 50 years." But NATO's operational procedures, devised and rehearsed during the Cold War, do not guarantee successful accomplishment of the new kinds of tasks. For example, as the reconstruction process in Bosnia continues, the need for civilian policing bodies has supplanted the reliance on armed soldiers for deterrence. NATO simply does not have the police or paramilitary units required for such tasks. Similarly, conflict prevention, mediation and monitoring require very different kinds of expertise from the ones NATO offers. Unless NATO develops own civilian intervention units or delegates more responsibilities to the OSCE, which is tasked with carrying out conflict prevention duties, the international community may be unable to implement its stabilization measures successfully. Another thorny issue is NATO's authority to act without the UN Security Council approval. The U.S. administration maintains that NATO will continue to act "in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter." However, U.S. officials argue that the alliance should be allowed to operate even when the formal authorization from the UN Security Council cannot be obtained. The question of UN authorizations for NATO mission arose from the dichotomy in NATO's original duties and newly proposed responsibilities. NATO plans to carry out collective security duties, such as peacekeeping operations, outside of its members' territory. Collective security organizations as, for example, the OSCE, are traditionally all-inclusive. The membership in organization implies the right of collective intervention in the affairs of the member states to prevent destabilization or conflicts. The collective security group's mandate to act is derived from the contract each country forms with the organization upon joining, and the decision of the member states. Unlike NATO, which requires unanimous approval of all members for its missions, the OSCE reserves the right to act over the objections of the member concerned in gross violations of the OSCE's principles. NATO remains an exclusive club in order to preserve its effectiveness as a defensive military alliance. Its intervention in the affairs of non-members without a UN of OSCE authorization lacks the legal foundation of a collective security organization. NATO's subordination to the UN is also anchored in the alliance's documents. Its founding text, the Washington Treaty of 1949, clearly obligates the allied nations to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Article 42, Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows a military intervention only "should the Security Council consider that [less forceful measures] would be inadequate or have been proven inadequate." Finally, NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept states that NATO's purpose is to "safeguard the freedom and security of all its members... in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." However, the problem also lies with the Security Council's inability to act swiftly and effectively during the Bosnia and Kosovo crises. The problem lies mainly with UN's decision-making mechanisms--the Security Council is often paralyzed and unable to act for reasons that have little in common with the conflicts on hand. In case of Kosovo, the NATO nations did not even try to obtain an explicit authorization from the Council fearing that the deepening rift between NATO and Russia made any agreement all but impossible. But the Kosovo crisis also pointed to a compromise solution NATO may seek in the future--the alliance sought and obtained an indirect endorsement of its plans from the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during his visit to NATO in January 1999. NATO may also seek in the future an authorization from the OSCE, rather than the UN. Finally, NATO enlargement and the proposals for the alliance's new missions presuppose the strengthening of U.S. leadership role in Europe. As Secretary Albright states, "...NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of American responsibilities in Europe." A vast majority of proposals put before NATO in preparation for the Washington summit came from the U.S. delegation. By implication, if the proposals are adopted they would require U.S. leadership to be implemented. The U.S. initiatives thus stifle the movement in NATO towards a greater role for the European members; a trend which would allow the United States to reduce the costly presence of almost 120,000 U.S. troops in Europe. Sources For More InformationBritish American Security Information Council (BASIC) Center for Defense Information (CDI) "NATO Expansion: Full Speed Ahead -- But Where To?" CDI Weekly Defense Monitor Collection of NATO articles on Global Beat web site Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty NATO articles NATO NATO at Fifty (maintained by the USIA) U.S. Mission to NATO Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission European Union (EU) EU Common Security and Foreign Policy Western European Union (WEU) NATO page by the Center for Defense Information Atlantic Council of the United States New Atlantic Initiative
II. CommentsI was glad to read Stephen Zunes' criticism of U.S. foreign policy [ in the previous Progressive Response, see http://www.fpif.org/progresp/vol3/prog3n7.html ] with regard to Turkey. With the capture of PKK leader Ocalan, Turkey has the opportunity to resolve the Kurdish problem by ending cultural repression of the Kurds. The U.S. should insist that Turkey seize the opportunity. Turkey, however, is attempting to divert such pressure with its repeated claims that Greece and Cyprus have been supporting Kurdish terrorism. Zunes is correct in pointing out that U.S. policies which ignore Turkey's violations of international laws and basic standards of human rights undermine U.S. credibility in the Middle East. They also risk promoting violent conflict in the eastern Mediterranean. Our toleration of Turkey's violations of international laws and UN resolutions make a mockery of our talk of the rule of law, and set a dangerous precedent that others have followed. The Iraqi ambassador and the Bosnian Serb leader have both cited Turkey's occupation of Cyprus as a reason for their own expectations. President Clinton has just apologized for past U.S. policies toward Guatemala, and stated that the United States will no longer take part in campaigns of repression. That statement should apply to Turkey as well. Anne Larson (alarson@igc.org)
The draft agenda for reforming U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean is now posted at the Global Affairs Agenda section of the Foreign Policy In Focus website. The FPIF editors are interested in any comments you might have. Among the concerns raised thus far by readers of the draft include the absence of language addressing U.S. immigration policy (which is of particular concern to Latin Americans, particularly in Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean), the support in the draft for trade preferences for the poorest nations in the region, and the lack of a more detailed policy on U.S. police aid. The FPIF editors are especially interested in comments by readers on these contentious subjects. The language in the draft regarding preferential access to the U.S. market is included here: "* U.S. trade and investment policy--which should promote regional prosperity, not just increased trade and investment--must consider the great disparities of wealth and economic development that exist between the U.S. and most of its hemispheric neighbors. This means accepting the lack of competitiveness exhibited by many economic sectors, particularly basic grains production, and granting Latin American and Caribbean nations preferential access to U.S. markets (by way of nonreciprocal tariff rates, for example) as well as the right to impose performance requirements (obligating industries to purchase a certain percentage of their inputs from domestic sources, for example) on foreign investment so as to foster local economic development." Nick Morgan wrote to express his appreciation of the inclusion of the following clause: "* Close all military bases in the Caribbean and Latin America and implement an overseas cleanup policy that eliminates double standards and is consistent with domestic cleanup requirements." David Barkin suggested that we consider the importance of supporting local autonomy: "I would like to stress not only the local govt autonomy issue, BUT also the importance of the autonomy of peoples within each country who find themselves objects of various forms of oppression."
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