The Progressive ResponseVolume 3, Number 15
Editor: Tom Barry (IRC)
Table of ContentsI. Updates and Out-TakesKOSOVO OPTIONS
II. CommentsKOSOVO FARCE AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER
I. Updates and Out-TakesKOSOVO OPTIONS
Julianne Smith, Senior Analyst, BASIC While public opinion regarding Kosovo changes as rapidly as the spring weather in Washington, one fact remains constant: the current crisis has most of the population in the Western world scratching their heads and asking themselves, "Just how did we get into this mess anyway?" Is NATO that short-sighted? Was Clinton's domestic battle with impeachment so distracting? Is the post-Cold War security environment so boring that we can no longer hire decent intelligence gatherers? If one simply connects the dots, the answer becomes apparent. Almost a decade after the end of the Cold War, the West has yet to invest in the preventive tools it needs for standard maintenance of a security system plagued by leaks. This capability gap has, in turn, left NATO with the current flood of disaster, which is now threatening the entire region with long-term damage. At present, NATO has two options: it can use the summit to announce a quick fix for Kosovo (unrelenting military might either through ground troops or the continuation of the air strikes) and hope that it'll be able to paint over the leaks that such a quick fix would inevitably produce. Alternatively, NATO can use the summit to take an inventory of its current toolbox, admit that such tools have not yet been effective in Kosovo (and probably won't be effective for future Kosovos), and work to outline a long-term regional approach to security in the Balkans. Such an approach would:
NATO may very well come up with a watered down version of one or more of the above listed options under the heading of a "Doctrine on Southeastern Europe." Remembering NATO's last reference to the crisis in Yugoslavia in its 1991 Strategic Concept, though, one should be cautioned against believing that this summit's rhetoric on the Balkans will be any different. Kosovo will indeed be mentioned at some point. Whether or not reference to the crisis will produce a constructive policy for the region as a whole remains to be seen. With NATO's pride on the line, Clinton and NATO will do their best to convince themselves and the public that their approach to Kosovo was the right one. And eventually, even with a short-sighted, quick fix from NATO, the smoke will clear, CNN will halt its 24 hour coverage of Kosovo, and we'll all stop scratching our heads and asking what went wrong. NATO will return to Brussels still blinded by the glint of its high-tech tools, and Clinton will start scripting the closing chapter of his term in office. Organizations working towards enhancing conflict prevention and crisis management will begin again their calls for more funding and support. Without the glitzy marketing appeal of shiny jets, a looming crisis to bring their cause to light, or admission by NATO that such softer security tools are needed, however, those calls will likely fall on deaf ears. And we'll stop connecting the dots... until the next crisis.
Michael Ratner, Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights This historical background should make us very skeptical regarding current U.S. and NATO claims that the war against Serbia is to stop "ethnic cleansing" or even "genocide." President Clinton says the bombings were necessary to prevent a "humanitarian catastrophe," to end "instability in the Balkans," and to prevent a wider war. But the evidence is otherwise. The NATO countries, as the historical record predicts, appear to be acting primarily in their own self-interests. To date the bombings have created the very evils President Clinton claims he is trying to prevent: over 500,000 refugees have fled Kosovo. Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, and even Bosnia are being destabilized; and Russia is threatening a wider war. The administration claims that Serbia was planning this ethnic cleansing and it would have occurred even without the NATO attacks. But even if this were the case, it was the NATO attacks that gave Serbia the opportunity to carry out its alleged plans, particularly in a circumstance when all of the unarmed monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were withdrawn. Nor should it be overlooked that the bombing itself probably caused many of the refugee to flee their homes. NATO had to have realized that its massive bombing campaign had the potential to create a serious humanitarian crisis, yet incredibly it had made no preparations for housing, feeding or caring for the refugees. Had humanitarian concerns been at the forefront of NATO policy, or even a serious concern, such plans would have been a priority. If the U.S. and NATO really believed that Serbia was planning "ethnic cleansing," then the bombing was the absolute worst strategy; it was almost guaranteed to bring about that result. If the goal was to really prevent expulsions of people from Kosovo, there were other peaceful alternatives that should have been undertaken. A sticking point in the negotiations with Yugoslavia was the deployment of 28,000 NATO troops in Kosovo; a compromise could have been worked out by making that force an international force of the United Nations or one that at least included Russian troops. In fact, just before the bombing the Serbian parliament supported the idea of a United Nations force to monitor a political settlement. Had this and other peaceful means been employed, there is a fair chance that the human tragedy unfolding in the Balkans could have been avoided. Once again it appears that the claim of humanitarian intervention is a pretext for countries acting in their own self-interest and for their own geo-political reasons. Western countries are insuring that it is they, not Serbia and Russia, who will be the dominant force in the Balkans; NATO is pushing Europe's borders into the edge of Asia. A NATO military base in the region cannot be far behind. Also at play here is the broader underlying interest of the United States to mold the world to its will through a policy of coercive diplomacy. Under this doctrine, when the United States tells another country to do something, it must buckle under or suffer the consequences. That is what the U.S. told Yugoslavia: sign the Rambouillet agreement or get bombed. It is not a way to negotiate and certainly not a way to create a safer world. That is why after World War II, the nations of the world through the Charter of the United Nations mandated that only the Security Council could authorize the non-defensive use of force: unlike the current U.S./NATO bombing, force was to be used in the interest of the international community and not individual states. (Taken from Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner, "Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo: A Highly Suspect Pretext for War," Center for Constitutional Rights, April 1999.)
Phyllis Bennis, Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies I think there may well have been (and still is) a moral imperative to intervene--but NOT for NATO! The U.S. sidelining of the UN in international affairs--replacing UN primacy either with unapologetic unilateralism as we saw during the last several years in Iraq, or with NATO as the bestower of international legitimacy as we are seeing in Kosovo--represents a major catastrophe for U.S. foreign policy. So while there may be a moral imperative, that doesn't make this U.S./NATO mission a moral response. Certainly one must be skeptical about morality having anything to do with U.S. policy. The continuing humanitarian crisis in Iraq--where far more people are still dying, today, as a direct result of U.S. policy, than are dying even now in Kosovo--should provide enough evidence to anyone for whom the delayed and disastrously handled attention to Somalia, the deliberate decision to allow genocide in Rwanda to go forward, the disasters of Bosnia, Sierra Leone, etc., still leave questions. But we cannot challenge Washington's double standards by claming that because they refused to move in the past, they should not move now. While we must continue to identify and condemn past failures to prevent or halt genocide, we must continue to demand appropriate action to prevent or stop such humanitarian crises now. The question for us should be whether there were other options beside this use of force by this agency--and the answer to that I think is yes. The UN Charter is unequivocal that the use of force is justified only in the context of two scenarios: either a Security Council authorization (despite, all of the problems inherent in that because of U.S. domination of the Council), or immediate self-defense response to armed aggression, and then only until the first opportunity for the Council to meet. What took place here was neither--it was a clear refusal by the U.S. (with the Brits trotting along behind) to allow the Council to debate the issue, as France had proposed. Even under the terms of the Genocide Convention, the obligation to act to prevent genocide does not supercede the primacy of the UN in responding to an international crisis. And whether or not one accepts the applicability of that term (based on the part of the definition of genocide that speaks of creating conditions that render the group's survival impossible--something that may well be approaching if the ethnic cleansing efforts result in a near-complete expulsion and forced dispersion of Albanian Kosovars from Kosovo) it is significant that the U.S. has NOT claimed it as a justification of its actions. And of course, U.S. awareness of the possibility (not probability, given Russia's continued dependence on Western aid) of a Russian veto does not provide a legal "out" for avoiding a Council decision. What might the Council have decided on, even if a full-scale UN Blue Helmet deployment was not a likely outcome? One very reasonable possibility as early as months ago could have involved UN authorization for an OSCE force--certainly not NATO-protection force, not the limited unarmed OSCE monitoring force that were pulled out at the moment they were most vitally needed. The UN Charter speaks of looking first to regional solutions to regional problems, but certainly OSCE, including eastern Europe and Russia as well as the western European powers, is a far better example of regional diplomatic actors than a U.S.-dominated NATO military alliance. What could the UN look towards now? One possibility would be to rely (however ironically) on the precedent set by the Korean War-era Uniting for Peace resolution. Under its terms, the General Assembly can, when the Council is judged to be deadlocked or otherwise unable to work, meet in special session to make decisions regarding war and peace, issues generally left to the providence of the Council. The Russians have recently proposed such an Assembly meeting. Its first task would be to call a halt to NATO's bombing and Serb expulsions, release of all detainees, and massive refugee assistance. While bringing NATO to heel, let alone the Milosevic-led military, would by no means be guaranteed by such a UN resolution, a specific Assembly demand for an end to the bombing would go far towards delegitimizing NATO's role, challenging the U.S. and reasserting the centrality of the UN in dealing with the ethnic cleansing, thus providing a much better chance of a policy that would, in the Hippocratic sense, "first do no harm." Further, the Assembly should not only call for a resumption of serious diplomacy, but delegate representatives to act in the name of the most democratic part of the UN, the General Assembly, to carry out such diplomacy on behalf of the international community. Such a diplomatic effort, I would propose, might best be carried out by Nelson Mandela and Kofi Annan--two African statesmen without personal vested interests in the region or conflict, but most importantly combining the international legitimacy of the UN with the internationally recognized personal credibility of the South African leader. (Statement taken from "Kosovo Roundtable: NATO Intervention, Ethnic Cleansing, and the U.S.," Sponsored by Mother Jones Magazine.)
Adm. Eugene Carroll, USN (Ret), Deputy Director, Center for Defense
Information (CDI) Can the crisis in Kosovo be solved by military action? Definitely not. In fact, there is no solution by any means within the foreseeable future. In a land where the battle of Kosovo fought between Serbs and Muslims 610 years ago is still considered a current event, there is no simple, certain solution or it would have been achieved decades or even centuries ago. Does that mean nothing can be done today to improve the tragic situation and reduce the suffering of innocent victims in Kosovo? Of course not. Conditions can be improved, but not if both sides continue to seek a permanent and complete solution. The best that can be hoped for initially is to reduce the violence and make the political-military confrontation manageable. The first misbegotten idea to abandon is that either side can hope to impose a military solution that will be equitable and just, two essential criteria to establish stable, enduring and peaceful conditions in Kosovo. There is no military solution. When military power is used exclusively in the form of air attacks, the problem is exacerbated. For all of its destructive capacity, air power alone cannot fundamentally change the military and political situation on the ground. Thus, the NATO decision to limit its actions to air attacks in order to protect Kosovar Albanians was doomed to failure. Far from protecting them, the attacks accelerated their victimization, and NATO will soon be presented with an ethnically cleansed Kosovo by Slobodan Milosevic, who will then be pleased to propose a cease-fire. This is the time for NATO, led by the United States, to carefully examine its ultimate objective and how best to achieve it. The temptation to insert ground troops must be resisted because it would be an even more disastrous effort to "solve" the Kosovo problem by escalating military action. What, then, should the objective be? It should be a negotiated settlement that contains adequate incentives for both sides to end the violence, as well as sanctions to redress significant violations in the future. It should provide for removal of all Serbian military and police forces from Kosovo in return for an end to NATO air attacks. Finally, it should establish international supervision within Kosovo of the peaceful repatriation and resettlement of returning Serbs and Kosovars. Implementation would be funded through the United Nations with major contributions from developed nations, principally NATO members. For a fraction of the billions of dollars that are being wasted in warfare now, the devastated Kosovo area could be restored to livable conditions and economic and medical aid provide through international agencies. At the same time, all sanctions against Yugoslavia should be lifted and normal relations resumed to assist in the rebuilding of a nation ravaged by airstrikes. Obviously, significant violations of the peace agreement by either side would result in the withdrawal of external assistance and the imposition of stringent sanctions against the offending party. This all seems reasonable and logical, but bringing it about would require powerful and effective mediation between NATO and the Serbian government. The obvious party to serve as the intermediary is Russia, acting at the request of the UN Security Council. The premature and futile effort more than a week ago by Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov could not succeed for two reasons. First, Mr. Milosevic knew full well that Russia could not unilaterally gain acceptance of any proposal to NATO. Second, the level of destruction had not yet begun to threaten the economic viability of Serbia but was only solidifying popular support there for Mr. Milosevic's defiance. Empowered by the UN Security Council and with the concurrence of NATO, the Russians could mount urgent and forceful pressure on Mr. Milosevic. It could provide a face-saving way for him to agree to a neutral body administering conditions in Kosovo as the price for an end to the air war and assistance in bringing about an economic recovery in Serbia. It is even more certain that the Kosovars would cooperate in order to end the violence and resume peaceful lives in their homeland. This approach would not "solve" the Kosovo problem It would restore a degree of stability and order in which all concerned parties could cooperate to manage the situation and employ nonviolent means to settle inevitable differences. This whole approach lacks the finality of military victory and unconditional surrender, but it has one great virtue--it is feasible and would save lives while continued pursuit of the impossible goal of a military solution will only perpetuate another Balkan tragedy. (Statement taken from "Can We Solve the Kosovo Problem?" Dallas Morning News, April 11, 1999.)
Jim Hooper, Executive Director, Balkan Action Center The war over Kosovo is about more than the fare of the people in the Balkans. What is at stake is the belief in American power, purpose and resolve in determining the values that post-Cold War Europe will abide by. If Serbia achieves its war objectives, the ethnic cleansers will set new ground rules for Europe. We can resolve the Kosovo conflict, but it is illusory to think that we can do it by diplomacy. The Serbs regard Kosovo as the birthplace of their culture and the touchstone of their national identity. The Serbian national myth commemorates the defeat of the Serbian army by the Ottoman Turks at the battle of Kosovo in 1389, which ushered in centuries of Ottoman rule over Serbia. Defeat is far preferable--and more honorable--to Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic and his people than dishonorable surrender or compromise. The only agreement over Kosovo that Mr. Milosevic might sign is a thinly disguised NATO capitulation. While the Serbs cherish the myth of Kosovo's importance, they refuse to reside there. More than 90 percent of the province's 2 million people are ethnic Albanians. Even a system of harsh repression instituted my Mr. Milosevic when he illegally ended Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 has failed to inspire sufficient confidence among Serbs to persuade them to move to Kosovo. Thus the political calculus behind ethnically cleansing the province: Kill or deport the Albanians as the prelude to repopulating Kosovo with Serbs. Mr. Milosevic has deliberately chosen the battlefield, rather than the negotiating table, as his arena of choice for resolving the Kosovo problem. If NATO is to prevail--and now that it is engaged, NATO can and must win--that is where the work must be done. The United States and its allies must be prepared to use whatever means are necessary to defeat the Serbs, including ground troops. NATO airstrikes alone can inflict significant damage. Only a combined air/ground campaign, however, can drive all Serbian forces from Kosovo and provide the security that will enable all Kosovar refugees to return to their homes and begin rebuilding their lives. But turning the tide of battle is going to require presidential leadership. All eyes are on the White House, waiting to see when President Clinton will begin to capitalize on growing national support for using ground troops to defeat Serbian forces. Much of Washington's political establishment, including a growing number of senators who are concerned about the implications of a NATO defeat, has rallied behind the ground-troop option. Recent opinion polls show that more than 50 percent of the American people back the deployment of ground troops to end the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe caused by Serbian ethnic cleansing and genocide. This support would increase with the president's help. It would take about 100,000 troops, including perhaps two U.S divisions, to drive Serbian forces from Kosovo. During a buildup phase lasting several weeks, these troops would assemble in neighboring states, especially Macedonia and perhaps Albania. NATO might also sound out Montenegro, which is federated with Serbia but under threat of Serbian attack, about stationing troops there. Such a deployment of troops would ease local concerns about Serbian threats. It would also stabilize the refugee situation, giving these fragile societies the confidence to provide temporary shelter to refugees who would soon be returning home. Cooperation from Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro in providing bases for troops should be supplemented with a program to begin training and equipping the Kosovars. Kosovo Liberation Army insurgents armed with little more than Kalashnikov rifles have fought bravely against Serbian armor and artillery. Properly armed and trained outside Kosovo, they could play a useful battlefield role as NATO auxiliaries. While the ground-force buildup was underway, NATO air power would continue to pound Serbian targets. Following the removal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo and the return of the refugees, NATO's political objective should be the establishment of self-government in Kosovo for a transition period of three years, with the option of seeking independence if democracy and stability take hold. NATO should avoid the pitfalls of attacking and occupying Serbia proper, where the population, unlike in Kosovo, would not welcome NATO troops. Establishing a de facto alliance with Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo itself would give the United States and NATO the foundation for a strategy against Mr. Milosevic that would isolate Serbia until the fires of ultranationalism burn low. The Balkans have become the new front line for NATO in post-Cold War Europe. NATO troops will be stationed in Kosovo and elsewhere in a containment belt around Serbia for years, but most of the combat troops needed to defeat the Serbs in Kosovo could depart once the conflict ends. NATO will have new burdens and responsibilities, post-Cold War American leadership will have passed a crucial credibility test, and the Serbian threat in the region will be over. (Statement taken from "Can We Solve the Kosovo Problem?" Dallas Morning News, April 11, 1999.)
II. CommentsKOSOVO FARCE AND THE NEW WORLD
ORDER
Several weeks into the U.S.-NATO all-out air strike against the small and weak Yugoslavia, many Americans are still wondering what the mess is all about. Is U.S.-NATO at war with Yugoslavia? In the first several days the NATO spokesman kept saying daily and categorically that "We are not at war with Yugoslavia" until one day three American soldiers were captured by the Yugoslav military, when all of a sudden NATO termed them as prisoners of war and never mentioned that line. This is only one example of Western governments' manipulation of words--and facts. As long as it serves their interest, terrorists become freedom fighters, spying becomes a normal part of journalism, and barbaric bombing of civilian targets becomes humanitarian mission, and so on. During the famous Prague Spring three decades ago a prominent Czechoslovak intellectual pointed out, when condemning the Communist propaganda, that the murder of words came only one step ahead of murdering the people. Those dissidents fought so hard for the right to know the truth for so many years and eventually brought down the Communist rule only to find their country is now part of this colossal war machine that is no less Orwellian in mass mind manipulation. How ironic. In the good old days of the Cold War, there were two superpowers whose formidable powers offset each other, which somewhat spared other nations from feeling their menacing heat one way or another and the world as a whole from tyranny. With the mere presence of the Soviet Union, no matter how evil an empire it might be otherwise, the United States had to act prudently and refrained from letting its foreign policy be carried away by crusading zeal. Gone are the days of bipolarity and the balance of power. What we are left in is a unipolar world where the United States enjoys a "universal dominion" (C. Krauthammer) and a free hand to fulfil its "neo-Manifest Destiny" (B. Watternberg). Isn't it nice? Most if not all Americans tend to rejoice. As long as the uni-pole, or the dominion center, is U.S., everything is supposed to be fine since "we are the good guys"--a given to almost all Americans. Yet it may not be that simple even from an American standpoint. A most precious American contribution to the political wisdom of human government is the theory and practice of "checks and balances" of power based on the presumption that humans are no angels and that absolute power corrupts absolutely. The wisdom of such assumptions is as robust in international settings as in domestic ones. Unchecked or unbalanced American power not only subjects the rest of the world to arbitrary American intervention but also subjects America to the temptation of imperial overextension, driven not by the traditional greed for land and treasure, but by its self-styled worldwide mission. While the overwhelming if not absolute power the U.S. possesses vis-a-vis other nations gives American foreign policy makers an unprecedented freedom of action, it also poses for them a serious challenge with grave responsibility. Now is one of the rare moments of history where the international system is undergoing a fundamental change in structure and humankind faces a brand new era of international relations whose features are yet to be defined. Are we going to have a world of "hegemonic stability," something like the "Western World" during the Cold War, led by a benign hegemony whose leadership is based on consensus rather than coercion, on legitimacy rather than strongarming? Or are we going to have a chaotic anarchy where unqualified law of the jungle reigns, dominated by a Big Brother who bullies other nations into obedience, making force the everyday currency of international politics? To a significant extent it is up to the United States, the sole superpower of the world, to determine what kind of world order we are going to live under in the coming decades, by choosing what kind of role it is to play in world affairs, a prudent stabilizer or a reckless crusader, a responsible leader, or a bullying hegemony. Legitimacy is the key that sets a responsible leader apart from a bullying hegemony. A responsible leader does not abuse its power but only uses it for legitimate purposes. It is legitimate to use force for self-defense or collective security, as sanctioned by the United Nations Charter and as epitomized in the Gulf War which repelled the Iraqi aggression; it is not legitimate, however, for the strong to use force to impose its will on the weak and to interfere with other nations' internal affairs in the name of ideological causes, be it democracy, human rights, self-determination or whatever, as in the case of Kosovo, unless there is a clear-cut case of genocide and an international consensus to act against it. A responsible leader respects and upholds international law and order--the crux of which is the inviolability of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, rather than violates it by its own example and for its own convenience. The violation of this principle not only is illegitimate, but also sets a dangerous precedent for other perpetrators. The major justification for the Gulf War was that Iraq violated Kuwait's sovereignty and territorial integrity, yet only 8 months prior to the Iraqi invasion, the U.S. committed the same offense with its invasion of Panama. The legitimacy of responsible leadership is based on the consent of its followers out of respect and acceptance, whereas a bully can only extract obedience by sheer intimidation and blunt force. To earn such respect and acceptance, a responsible leader must be truthful to and consistent with the moral principles it advocates, and shun double standards or expediency, as hypocrisy only makes "the natural resentments against our power on the part of the weaker nations ... be compounded with resentments against our pretensions of superior virtue" (R. Niebuhr); it must be sensitive and inclusive to the values of other nations and cultures, and not be self-centered and self-righteous; it must treat other nations, small and weak as they may be, with due respect and not boss them around with the arrogance of power; it must resort to persuasion, compromise, and coalition-building, no matter how painstaking these may be, rather than arm-twisting and dictation in order to lead the nations; and finally it must be willing and prepared to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship" as a leader is obliged to, and as the U.S. once did for the Western World during the Cold War by providing all the public goods necessary to sustain the regime and to hold the community together. The United States is unlikely to earn from the rest of the world the respect and acceptance necessary for a legitimate leader if this country remains what it has been for years now: the stingiest of the developed countries in terms of providing development aid to the Third World, the biggest debtor owing billions in overdue membership to the United Nations, the increasingly tightened market now demanding an "equal footing" in trade competition with those supposed to benefit from its leadership, and a country so apt to use force against other nations yet disallowing the loss of American life as a taboo that must be avoided at any price--even at the expense of the lives of innocent civilians in other countries, such as those lost in the indiscriminant air strike so favored by the U.S. just because its soldiers can hide under the skirt of American high-tech weaponry. While the world does not want a fanatic crusader or a reckless cowboy, it does need a leader that has the courage to take whatever it takes to fulfil its duty, including the casualty of its own people. The U.S.-NATO aggression against Yugoslavia has alerted many lesser powers who are not American satellite to the possibility that any one of them may fall victim to the next Operation American Justice, and may push some, most notably Russia and China, closer to each other toward a sort of counterbalancing alliance. Yet such a prospect is greatly obscured by the instability and uncertainties in the domestic politics of both countries, not to mention the lingering mutual suspicion rooted in the long history of hostility between the two nations. Without an outside balancing power (of one state or an alliance of states) in sight, any possible checks to America's monopolistic power can only come from within, that is, from the self-restraint exercised by an enlightened public. Unfortunately, American public sentiment on foreign affairs is by no means moderate. Elated and emboldened by its triumph over the Soviet Union and relieved from the necessity of the Cold War, economic nationalism, political unilateralism and self-righteousness are taking hold while internationalism, multilateralism and discretion are out of fashion. Jingoism flies high when the U.S. goes abroad for confrontation, with or without legitimate cause. Most alarming, however, is the disappearance of the independent media, as can be seen most clearly during the Kosovo crisis. Unbalanced, unobjective, heavily tinted with ideological and national bias, the war coverage by American mainstream news media has been so consensual and orchestrated that it amounts to nothing but propaganda. Perhaps it is not because all American journalists have become ideologues but because of the bottom line of the infotainment industry: Patriotism if not Chauvinism sells. As such, the checks and balances from within are something one may pray for but not count on, at least in the near future. Americans may need another Vietnam to refresh the lessons they learned from that war and to bring them back to senses. But until then, the world may just have to live in the shadow of the Big Brother, or rather the Big Uncle, Uncle Sam. (Ruizhuang Zhang <jczhang@socrates.berkeley.edu> is a senior associate fellow at the Modern Management Center in Shanghai, China.)
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